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Abstract 
 
Since its reform in 1998, the national association of French employers and industry, 
MEDEF, seems to be an example of strong interest organisation. Unlike trade unions, 
the peak business organization has been stable and unified, if one considers membership 
density. Through a study of the collective action of businesses in France, this article 
sheds doubt on such an impression and argues that the national business association has 
been put severely under stress in recent years. Like all encompassing associations, 
MEDEF comprises a great variety of interests and constantly has to manage its internal 
heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its recent reform 
demonstrates that MEDEF’s forceful media campaign should not be understood as a 
display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action 
that the association can claim legitimately as their responsibility.   
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Introduction1 
The political representation of private interests in France has changed 
profoundly in recent years. Traditionally regarded with suspicion, interest groups and 
lobbying are slowly becoming acknowledged political phenomena. In the context of 
European integration and the globalization, private actors find more and more access 
points to the political process and may even circumvent their government on certain 
issues (Grossman and Saurugger 2004). Yet the French state also actively solicits 
societal input to policy-making, which has led several authors to speak of a 
“participatory turn” (Rey et al. 2005; Grossman and Saurugger 2006).  
These transformations have affected the place of business interests in French 
politics. With the breakdown of a statist or “dirigist” system (see Wright 1997; 
Culpepper forthcoming 2006), the position and political clout of business actors have 
been bolstered (Schmidt 1996a; Schmidt 1996b). This analysis seems to be in line with 
popular impressions about the new strength of the national peak organization of 
business interests. Reinventing itself in 1998, the Conseil national du patronat français 
(CNPF) became the Mouvement des enterprises de France (MEDEF) and launched a 
public relations campaign that many observers interpreted as the rising dominance of 
business interests in French public affairs. According to press reports, MEDEF 
is “organizing a permanent coup d’Etat,” “leads the dance,” “is in the control tower.”2 
Trade unions complain about the “coalition between MEDEF and the government.”3 
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  “Le Medef mène la danse,” Le Figaro, 18 janvier 2000; “Comment le Medef organise son 
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Seemingly, a part of the population shares this impression: over 10 000 people 
demonstrated against the influence of the business association during the annual 
congress of MEDEF in 2002. 
The apparent strength of the central French business organization is surprising in 
international comparison. As studies of neo-corporatist countries show, business peak 
associations are profoundly challenged by internationalization and European integration 
(Streeck et al. 2006; Heinisch 2000; Lehmkuhl 2000). Struggling to adapt their internal 
structures to these new challenges, the organization of business and employer interests 
everywhere moves from corporatist representation to more pluralist arrangements. 
Arguably, France has never really been a truly neo-corporatist country, so why should 
these challenges affect its peak organization as much as in other countries?4 Indeed, the 
membership density of CNPF, traditionally one of the highest in Europe, has barely 
moved between 1986 and 1996 (Traxler 2006: 100).5 Is France an exception then, where 
recent political and economic evolutions have in fact reinforced the role of the central 
business associations?  
Contrary to popular impression in France, this article argues that it is not the 
case. Recent transformations have indeed favoured the role of large firms in policy-
making (Schmidt 1996a; Hancké 2002), but they have put severe stress on the 
encompassing business associations at the national level. The recent reform of MEDEF 
and the public relations campaign that followed should therefore not be mistaken as a 
demonstration of force. Rather, they were the reaction to a crisis that the organization 
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  Neo-corporatism refers to the inclusion of business associations and workers’ unions in the 
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Streeck/Kenworthy (2005). 
5
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had been facing in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Like all peak associations, the CNPF 
constantly has to manage its internal interest heterogeneity and only succeeds in 
unifying its members when it is facing external threats (Streeck 1991; see also Olson 
1993). The activities of such associations therefore need to be explained not only by the 
pursuit of the quest for political influence, but also by the need to manage their internal 
cohesion. Schmitter and Streeck (1999) have called these two motivations, “the logic of 
influence” and “the logic of membership.” 
By situating MEDEF’s recent reform in its historical context and by showing the 
heterogeneity of the political representation of French firms, the article shows that the 
turn to a more aggressive public relations strategy was the last resort for an organization 
that else would have be incapable of unifying its diverse constitutive interests. It could 
even be even argued that de-unionization in France was paralleled by a similar crisis in 
the political mobilization of business representatives, even though the two are difficult 
to compare. In an effort to counter this collective action crisis, the peak organization had 
to move away from collective political action on behalf of all firms and turn to a more 
membership-oriented strategy. Moreover, it had to abandon it previous discrete 
approach to political participation and adapt to more aggressive strategy of public 
political deliberation that is characteristic of pluralism (Streeck and Visser 2006: 247).  
Despite different starting positions, France is therefore no different that their 
neo-corporatist counterparts in Scandinavia, the Netherlands or Germany. Faced with 
secular changes to their membership base and their political role, the peak organization 
had to distance itself from its former function and develop into a business lobby capable 
of speaking in the name of French firms. When evaluating the changing role of business 
interests in French politics, one therefore needs to distinguish between individual firms 
and encompassing associations. Throughout Europe, firms have developed into more 
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active political actors, but the position of national peak organization has been put under 
stress in the last twenty years, even in countries that had only weak neo-corporatist 
structures.6  
In order to analyze the difficult organization of business interests in France, this 
paper begins with the question: how is the collective action of firms possible? 
Understanding the historical reasons for founding a French business confederation helps 
to understand the current challenges that led to the 1998 reform. From a historical 
perspective, the first section shows that the organization of firms and employers at the 
national level arose only in response to common attacks and is weakened every time 
these external threats disappear. Until today, the landscape of French business 
representation continues to be fragmented, as the second section shows. This 
fragmentation helps to understand the crisis of business representation in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s. Horizontal and vertical competition between groups and federations 
constantly puts stress on the central administration. Since information about internal 
tensions is not easily available, the third section discusses the difficulties of organizing 
coherent collective action through the prism of electoral participation and provides a 
brief analysis of the evolution of social dialogue in France. The final section returns to 
the study of MEDEF and analyzes its recent reform. By connecting the difficulties of 
business representation in France in general to the reform of its central organization, the 
article cautions that a strategy dictated by the requirements of its membership base 
should not be confused with a proof of political influence. The conclusion highlights the 
comparative lessons of this country study. 
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 The present analysis draws on a series of interviews with French business representatives, 
carried out between January 2001 and July 2005.  
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1. The “raisons d’être” of French business associations 
This article focuses on the collective action of French firms through business 
associations.7 With the exception of several excellent historical studies (Villey 1923; 
Ehrmann 1957; Bunel and Saglio 1979; Weber 1986; Garrigues 2002), there are few 
analyses of French business associations, especially when compared with the wealth of 
studies on the French trade unions. In particular, we know little about the ways in which 
encompassing organizations in France manage the interests of all the different types of 
French firms. What unites firms of different sizes, sectors or regions? The answer is 
much less evident than the stereotypes associated with the “patronat” suggest (for 
further discussion see Cohen 1988; Marin 1988).  
Certainly, the existence of an encompassing organization of French firms is a 
historical fact. The central organization, MEDEF, represents almost two-thirds of 
French firms today.8 This is a quite unified front compared to the trade union 
movement, which is divided into five representative unions at the national level and a 
handful of independent unions. Still, it was not the desire to express a common national 
interest that led French firms to build this association. Rather, it was created in response 
to two external threats: state interventionism and the trade union movement. Without 
several important crises caused by these two forces, firms and employers would have 
never mobilized collectively. The history of French business associations is therefore a 
stop-and-go evolution that is, above all, reactive to forces coming from its external 
environment. At least four founding periods have led to the formation of the association 
we know today (for further information, see Priouret 1963; Lefranc 1976; Weber 1986). 
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 In France, industrial associations are not separate from employers’ associations. Therefore, 
when the term “business associations” is used, it refers to employers’ associations as well.  
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 Exact numbers are difficult to obtain because firms are affiliated with MEDEF only 
indirectly through sectoral or regional associations. On its website, MEDEF indicates that it 
represents about 750,000 French firms. According to the national statistics institute INSEE, 
there were 1,217,000 French firms with at least one employee in 2003, <http://www.insee.fr>. 
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1.1. Historic origins 
Initially, French firms united in order to oppose the free trade policies of the 
French state between 1835 and 1860. After several smaller associations, the first 
interprofessional association, the Association pour la Défense du Travail National was 
founded in 1846 to fight for the exclusion of foreign products at the World Fair in Paris, 
which it obtained in 1849. Simultaneously, 11 professions belonging to the construction 
sector formed the Groupe de la Sainte-Chapelle in 1848, followed ten years later by a 
competing Union nationale du commerce et de l’industrie. The opposition between 
different professions and branches thus accelerated the formation of different groups. 
A second impulse came at the turn of the century: the trade union movement. In 
1884, the Waldeck-Rousseau law affirmed the right to form a trade union, both for 
workers and employers, which had been illegal with short exceptions since the French 
Revolution. The unionization that followed was paralleled by the growth of business 
associations, but mostly at the regional and sectoral level. A real soar followed the 
emergence of the radical trade union movement and the mass strikes that shook several 
European countries in 1905. By founding the Conseils du Travail, the French 
government obliged employers and trade unionists to meet and work on social issues 
(Olszak 1995). Feeling the need to get organized, the Comité des Forges founded the 
Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières (UIMM) in 1901, which was to 
become one of the pillars of the employers movement. Specializing in industrial 
relations, the association most notably organized a mutual fund which compensated 
members in the case of strikes.  
Between 1914 and 1918, a third impulse came directly from the interventionism 
of the French state. World War I led to a dirigisme de guerre, for which the government 
needed to institute a dialogue with the economic actors. At the same time, the 
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government became more and more involved in industrial relations, above all with the 
law on collective negotiations in June 1919 which increased the political power of trade 
unions. In reaction to these events and at the suggestion of the French government, 
firms and employers reinforced their representative institutions. In 1919, the 
Confédération Générale de la Production Française (CGPF) was founded at the 
initiative of the minister of industry and commerce, Etienne Clémentel, to speak for 21 
sectoral federations of some 1,200 professional associations. The CGPF benefited from 
the exclusive recognition of the French state and became the national representation of 
French firms. However, the CGPF proved to be merely a façade rather than a real 
organization of French firms. On several occasions, it was not even capable of 
producing reliable statistics on its members because all of them feared that giving out 
information on their activities would ruin their competitive positions (Ehrmann 1957; 
Weber 1986: 73).  
This hollowness was partially filled in a final organizational wave between 1936 
and 1946, when French firms had to face the government of the Front populaire and the 
corporatism under Vichy. June 1936 was a cataclysmic moment for the business leaders 
in France (Kolboom 1986). The election victory of the socialist government of Léon 
Blum coincided with the first general strike that paralyzed production in all factories of 
the country. While most employers’ associations refused negotiations, certain 
employers started making concessions to the workers’ movement. The patronat was 
finally obliged to review its strategy and ended up signing the Matignon Agreement 
with the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) on June 7. The agreement put the 
entire employer representation into question. Business leaders outraged by the 
willingness of the CGPF to negotiate with the CGT faced others who felt humiliated by 
the lack of coordination and reliable statistics about the extent of the strike and the 
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working conditions in individual factories (Ehrmann 1957: 6-7). Obliged to participate 
more seriously in tripartite negotiations, the CGPF took over the responsibility for 
industrial negotiations from the UIMM and started to rethink its organization. 
Paradoxically, however, it was the dissolution of the confederations under the 
Vichy government that had an important effect for the internal reorganization. On 
August 16, 1940, the government replaced the CGPF with “Comités d’organisation” 
(CO) organized by sector. Membership and the implementation of the CO’s directive 
became mandatory. During this period, French firms got used to paying financial 
contributions, distributing statistical information and cooperating with government 
representatives. The semi-public status of the COs also allowed the establishment of 
administration and management procedures. Despite the dissolution of the COs after 
1945, these formal elements survived the Vichy period, which explains the internal 
organization of business associations in the postwar period. The years immediately 
following the war were a very dark time for French firms. They were accused of having 
collaborated with the occupation. Then, in 1946, the socialists and the communists won 
the election of the Assemblée Constituante and nationalized certain infrastructure 
sectors. As it reorganized itself, French business not only had to come to terms with the 
past, but also had to learn from the lessons of 1936. These ambitions led to the Conseil 
National du Patronat Français (CNPF) on June 12, 1946. 
1.2. Instability punctuated by moments of coherence 
The history of the collective action of French firms and employers shows that 
their mobilization was only possible through the resistance to state interventionism and 
the trade union movement. Moreover, the associational and administrative structures 
after the war, especially at the highest level, are much more the result of state activism 
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than an organic development of common interests. In fact, the interests of firms and 
employers are far more specific, sometimes ephemeral and often contradictory; they do 
not easily produce a general direction for political activities.  
Only when it was defending itself was the national organization able to regroup 
and overcome the inadequacies of its collective action. After its creation in 1919, the 
CGPF reformed itself for the first time after the defeat in 1936, responding also to 
increasing tensions between large, small and medium-sized firms (SME): It became the 
Confédération Générale du Patronat Français, replacing the P in “production” with the 
P in “patronat.” Later on, the strikes in 1968 raised doubt about the conservatism of the 
CNPF. A subsequent reform in October 1969 aimed to centralize its authority and set up 
a new internal structure. The transition from the CNPF to MEDEF in 1998 followed the 
same logic. Having been defeated on the issue of the 35-hour work week, the 
association gathered momentum for another internal reform: It changed its name and 
logo and developed a new political strategy.  
Even though the confederation blossomed to full legitimacy during these 
specific historical moments, the collective action of firms outside of these defensive 
phases is largely characterized by heterogeneity, i.e. a high number of professional or 
local associations and their autonomy from central decision making. Against this 
background, “the elimination of conflicts [happens] through organizational 
fragmentation” (Streeck 1991: 179). Indeed, managing their diversity is a real challenge 
for the collective action of French firms. 
2. Diversity and tensions in the political representation  
In their comparative study of business associations, Schmitter and Streeck 
(1999) show that this challenge applies to the political activities of firms everywhere. 
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The success and coherence of business associations therefore depends on the services 
they can provide to their members and the looseness of centralized coordination. 
Moreover, the French organizational landscape is particularly redundant due to the 
ambiguous institutionalization of the peak organizations: Recognized as representative 
confederations, the horizontal organizations have never been as powerful as some of 
their counterparts abroad. A consequence of this lack of stable relations is that many 
organizations acquire similar competences and then overlap or compete with each other. 
At the national level, not just one but several confederations represent French 
firms and employers. Besides MEDEF, there are the small and medium-sized 
enterprises’ Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (CGPME), 
the crafts confederation Union Professionnelle Artisanale (UPA), the union of liberal 
professions Union Nationale des Professions Libérales (UNAPL) and the agricultural 
confederation Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA). 
These voluntary associations coexist with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(CCI), where affiliation is mandatory. The Assemblée des Chambres Française de 
Commerce et d’Industrie (ACFCI) and the Assemblée Permanente des Chambres des 
Métiers (APCM) are the peak organizations of the chambers of commerce structure.9 In 
contrast to these mandatory forums, the voluntary associations depend upon the 
recognition of the French state for their political legitimacy. Only representative 
organizations, such as MEDEF, CGPME, UPA and since 1997 the UNAPL, have the 
right to participate in collective negotiations. In other words, no single organization can 
speak for all of the firms or employers in France.10 
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 CCIs play an economic role and concentrate on providing services to their members, but 
the ACFCI is also consulted in several political committees and designates the representatives to 
the Conseil Économique et Social, together with MEDEF and the CGPME. 
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 However, on October 7, 1986, CNPF, CGPME, FNSEA, UNAPL and UPA joined forces 
against the socialist government and formed the Comité de Liaison des Décideurs Économiques 
(CLIDE). With few exceptions, this forum has been practically invisible over the last 20 years.  
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2.1. Axes of tension 
The interests of French firms differentiate along several axes, which creates a 
certain amount of tension underneath the highest level of representation. To begin with, 
MEDEF, CGPME and UPA do not represent actual people. As confederations 
assembling professional unions or federations, the indirect members of the peak 
associations are firms, not company directors. Even though the business leaders are the 
ones who represent their firms in the committees of the confederation, the interest of a 
firm is not always equivalent to the interest of its chief executive officer or its owner. 
Therefore, several associations have formed explicitly to represent particular groups of 
actual business leaders, such as the Association of Women Entrepreneurs (Association 
des Femmes Chefs d’Entreprises – FCE), the Center for Young Entrepreneurs (Centre 
des Jeunes Dirigeants - CJDES) and the Christian Entrepreneurs (Entrepreneurs et 
Dirigeants Chrétiens – EDC). The tension between individuals and firms is thus a first 
line of differentiation of these actors’ political representation.  
A second and more important axis of tension comes from the different sizes and 
types of firms. Since federations are structured around sectors of activity, professions or 
regions, representatives working in the committees of MEDEF speak for the automobile 
industry, for example, or for the Northern region, but not for the group of firms of their 
size or type. This was already a problem in the interwar period and explains the creation 
of the CGPME in 1944, the UPA in 1975 and the UNAPL in 1977. However, it is 
wrong to assume that these new organizations represent the smaller firms and MEDEF 
the large ones. According to MEDEF’s website, 70 % of the firms it represents have less 
than 50 employees.11 It is true that big companies have more weight than small 
companies, but even the most important ones have to reconcile their interests with the 
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 For more information, see http://www.medef.fr. 
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general interests of their sector or region in order to have a lasting influence in the 
internal decision-making. For these reasons, large firms founded the Association des 
Grandes Entreprises Françaises (AGREF) in 1967, which turned into the Association 
Française des Entreprises Privées (AFEP-AGREF) in 1981 after the nationalization of 
certain industries under the socialist government. Unlike the other confederations for 
different sized firms, the AFEP is not a representative organization, but rather a 
corporate think tank like the Entreprises de Taille Humaine, Indépendante et de 
Croissance (ETHIC), the Institut de l’Entreprise, the Institut Montaigne or Entreprise et 
Progrès. 
However, it is wrong to assume that each of the associations based on size has a 
monopoly on the representation of different segments of the French business landscape. 
On the contrary, many of their competences and even their representatives overlap. 
Since the ambition of MEDEF is to represent all French firms, it has had a working 
group of SMEs for a long time. As a consequence, double and even triple representation 
is quite common. It is difficult to find accurate figures, but one estimation suggests that 
60 % of the members of the CGPME are also affiliated to MEDEF.12 
These two axes of tension are still less important than the complexity of the 
federal structure and with it, the competition between different sectors and the 
redundancy of professional and regional membership. Even professional representation 
is sometimes problematic. Based on a diverse list of criteria – e.g. materials used, 
techniques, phases of the product cycles, final products – different professional trade 
associations often overlap. Sometimes, their competences are so close that two 
associations are in direct competition. To cite an example, the Union Nationale des 
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Entreprises de Travail Temporaire and the Syndicat des Professionnels du Travail 
Ttemporaire compete for members and the representation of temp workers within 
MEDEF (Bunel 1997b: 9). Furthermore, the representation of French firms is also 
divided into horizontal regional associations, like the Association des Producteurs des 
Alpes Françaises. These regional associations exist at the level of cities, départements, 
regions and other territorial units, again often with considerable overlap. They are not 
only assembled into one or several federations at a higher regional level, but also into 
subdivisions of MEDEF, the so-called MEDEF territoriaux.  
2.2. A complex universe of representation 
A single firm is thus quite often affiliated to its primary craft association, a 
horizontal regional association and its local chamber of commerce, which are in turn 
members of sectoral associations, territorial federations and the confederation of CCIs. 
At the lowest level, one can find powerful trade associations or almost inactive 
groupings of firms. Furthermore, the territorial representation of MEDEF and the 
CGPME might co-exist, divide its work or merge, like they have done in the Midi-
Pyrénées region. The structure of any of the peak associations is therefore quite 
complex and far from rational. Although the different levels are loosely linked, the 
sectoral and regional associations jealously guard their autonomy with respect to 
political statements and to membership fees, which can sometimes be quite uneven 
(Bunel 1997b: 13). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Any detailed examination of the political representation of French firms quickly 
reveals its complexity, simplified schematically in Figure 1. In addition to this, there are 
ideological differences in different historical contexts, such as free trade, competition 
policy and the social role of employers.  
The perceived unity of French business is not a natural occurrence and is not due 
a perceived facility of capitalist interests to organize more easily than labor (Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1980); it is the result of a political process. Inside MEDEF, certain groups 
have been able to establish hegemonic positions, like UIMM, which has played an 
essential role in social policy since the beginning. In fact, the CNPF has never elected a 
president who did not have the support of the metal industry.13 Between the different 
federations, battles and compromises have helped to establish an informal order for 
political activities. A former president of CGPME explains that his role is simply to 
“assure behind the scenes that MEDEF integrates the position of CGPME into its 
discussion with the trade unions and the government.”14 This informal order gives some 
coherence to the collective action of French business, but heterogeneity, competition, 
redundancy and coordination difficulties constantly threaten this apparent unity.  
3. French business representation in crisis? 
The historical origins and structure of business representation in France show 
that its collective action is a fragile process. Due to the multiple tensions described in 
the previous section, coherence only arises after periods where external developments 
have raised doubt about the performance of the peak organization. Traditionally, these 
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 The recent election of Laurence Parisot as the new president of MEDEF in July 2005 
marked a small revolution. As the candidate of the service sector, Laurence Parisot won for the 
first time against the candidate of the industry federations, Yvon Jacob. See Mériaux 
(forthcoming). Cf. “Medef: les métallos ne font plus la loi,” Le Point, 26 mai 2005. 
14
 Quoted in Saurugger (Saurugger forthcoming:13).  
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external shocks came from state interventionism or the labor movement. Outside of 
these specific conjunctures, the stickiness of institutional forms might give the 
impression that French firms are well organized, but care should be taken not to assume 
that this appearance implies political impact. 
Yet if French firms need external threats to reinforce their unity, what are the 
effects of de-unionization and the retreat of the French state from a number of economic 
domains formerly under its control? If free enterprise and the requirements of the 
markets become accepted societal values, do the peak organizations not lose their 
principal justification? Indeed, in the mid-1990s, many observers agreed that the 
political representation of firms was undergoing a crisis (quoted in Dubois 1999). The 
studies by Jean Bunel  (1995; 1997a; 1997b) are some of the rare and precious attempts 
to evaluate the force of this collective action over time. He shows that the central 
coordination of political activities has indeed been in decline since the 1970s. After all, 
one of the main functions of the peak organizations CNPF/MEDEF, CGPME, UPA and 
UNAPL is to represent their members in bipartite or tripartite forums. As the most 
encompassing organization, MEDEF (and before it CNPF) obtained its fullest 
legitimacy from the co-administration of such neo-corporatist institutions. However, 
most neo-corporatist elements have been viewed sceptically over the last twenty-five 
years by business leaders. Can we then speak of a crisis comparable to the one the trade 
union movement has been going through? And if there was a crisis, has the reform of 
the CNPF succeeded in overcoming it? In order to evaluate the causes and the effects of 
the transition from the CNPF to MEDEF, it is necessary to study the evolution of 
collective action of French firms.  
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3.1. Lack of membership data 
Unfortunately, a statistical comparison between the two evolutions is difficult, 
since gathering data about business membership poses several challenges (but see 
Traxler 2000; Traxler 2006). Most importantly, the number of affiliations does not 
really measure the degree to which firms support their political associations. This is due, 
first of all, to the fact that membership of firms is often indirect: Firms are members 
only of their immediate professional or local associations, which are then federated into 
the different levels of the peak organizations. Yet, although the members of MEDEF are 
actually federations themselves, the services MEDEF offers are aimed at firms.  If these 
firms were no longer content with the services or the performance of the peak 
organization, they would need to disaffiliate as an entire sector or region, which is often 
difficult. Second, the multiple affiliations of associations and individual firms make it 
impossible to figure out overall support or political activity based on the membership 
statistics. Third, the affiliation of firms often does not only result from general interest 
or support, but also from the services the association offers to its members, as we will 
see further on. 
In sum, we do not have meaningful membership statistics. Information about 
disputes or tensions between federations and the peak organization are also not easily 
available, as they are most often handled discreetly. Thus unable to study corporate de-
unionization or internal coordination directly, we have to rely on alternative indicators 
about the evolution of the collective action of French firms. Following the work of 
Bunel, this article examines the degree to which entrepreneurs participate in the election 
of their representatives in two political institutions: the Chambers of Commerce and the 
work tribunals, the Conseil des Prud’hommes. A brief examination of collective 
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negotiation shows that falling electoral participation corresponds to a decentralization of 
collective decision-making in industrial relations.  
3.2. Electoral participation 
Entrepreneurs vote on a regular basis for their representatives in two forums: the 
Chambers of Commerce (CCI) and the Conseils de Prud’hommes. The CCIs are 
mandatory chambers of representation with two principal functions: to act as the 
interface between the firms and the French state in several consultative organs such as 
the Conseil Economique et Social, and to promote and support business activities in 
France and abroad by offering services, educational opportunities and expertise (see 
Andolfatto 2000). At present, there are 155 local CCIs and 20 regional CCIs in France. 
The Conseils de Prud’hommes are public tribunals charged with resolving disputes 
between employers and employees over their work contract. The conseillers 
prud’hommes are people from different sectors and regions who represent either 
employers or employees depending on their own background. These bipartite work 
tribunals are unusual judicial institutions since the judges are elected every five years. 
Today, 14,610 conseillers prud’hommes sit in the 271 work tribunals in France.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The drop in electoral participation for both institutions since the 1970s is 
striking. From 1979 to 1997, the work tribunal election participation decreased from 
50% to 21 %. After participation levels of 40 % in the 1970s, the participation in the 
CCI elections dropped to about 20 % between 1988 and 2000: One in five voters 
abstained.  
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How should this low voter turnout be interpreted? With respect to the work 
tribunals, the drop in employer participation corresponds to the worker participation: 
After a high level of over 63 % in 1979 and 59 % in 1982, the percentage dropped by 
almost half in the following fifteen years: 34 % of employees participated in 1997 and 
33 % in 2002. Does employer participation simply align? It is indeed difficult to 
understand why employers should mobilize for bipartite work tribunals that do not even 
interest employees anymore, despite the fact that the large majority of cases are decided 
in favour of the workers. But what explains the fact that employer participation rose 
again to almost 27 % in 2002, while employee participation continued to drop? The 
same surge of mobilization happened in the CCI elections, where participation climbed 
to 26 % in 2004.  Part of this increase might be due to the fact that the 2004 CCI vote 
was the first election where employers could participate by “e-vote.” Still, the 
simultaneous reversal of the two participation declines is striking.  
Inversely, we could also ask why participation was so high in the 1970s, 
especially for the CCIs where participation was rarely high. Before the Second World 
War, and then between the 1950s and 1970s, participation was at around 20%, like it 
was in the 1990s. Only in the 1960s did it rise and oscillate between 33 % and 40 %.15 It 
thus seems more important to explain the rise of electoral participation in the 1970s and 
in 2004 than the weak mobilization during the other periods. Bunel (1995: 78) suggests: 
Few entrepreneurs vote regularly because the democratic dimension of these institutions 
is not evident to them; just as the majority of shareholders do not participate in the 
general assembly of a joint stock company. However, these elections become important 
to them when they feel threatened.  
The analysis of electoral participation thus confirms the hypothesis that 
collective action suffers when firms and entrepreneurs do not feel threatened. Their 
general unease was strong in the years between 1968 and the election of François 
                                                 
15
 After 20 % from 1920 to 1950, participation rose to about 24 % in the 1960s (Andolfatto 
1993).  
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Mitterrand in 1981. After the U-turn of the socialist government in 1983, the decline of 
the labour movement and the fall of communism, employer unity fell steadily and 
contributed to a sense of crisis in the peak organization CNPF in the mid-1990s. The 
periods that followed the reform of CNPF in 1969 and the transition from CNPF to 
MEDEF in 1998 were in turn characterized by reinforced electoral participation. 
Whether the reforms of the peak organization have a positive effect on electoral 
participation or whether the two phenomena are parallel reactions to a sense of crisis is 
difficult to say. In either case, electoral mobilization increases. 
3.3. The transformation of industrial relations 
The mobilization of the entrepreneurs is not the only indication of a change in 
their collective actions. It is also necessary to look at the role and function of the peak 
associations. According to a survey in 1994, only 21 % of firm representatives think that 
the CNPF should be a real employers’ association that defends the interests of business 
owners and employers.16 Seemingly, the old neo-corporatist functions of the peak 
organization have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the entrepreneurs.  
Indeed, a superficial glance at the complex history of industrial relations in 
France indicates that the role of the peak organization in collective negotiations might 
also be changing (Lallement forthcoming 2006). Over the last twenty-five years, 
CNPF/MEDEF has sought to disengage from bipartite institutions and collective 
negotiations at the national level and pursue a decentralization of industrial relations. 
Collective negotiations at the national level have existed since the Matignon Agreement 
in 1936. Since then, the representative employers’ organization and the trade unions 
have had two functions at the macro-level, First, they can engage in collective 
                                                 
16
 BVA Survey quoted in “Quel patron pour les patrons?” L’Expansion, no. 486, 7 November 
1994. 
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negotiations, often introduced by the government, and second, they jointly administer a 
series of bipartite institutions on issues such as unemployment, social security, and 
pensions, for example the Association pour l’Emploi Industriel et Commercial 
(ASSEDIC), the Union Nationale pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce 
(UNEDIC) the Agence Centrale des Organismes de Sécurité Sociale (ACOSS) or the 
Union des Caisses Nationales de Sécurité Sociale (UCANSS). At least since the 1990s, 
these two functions have been severely criticized by French business leaders as “hollow 
tripartism.”17 The proposal for selective disengagement was passed by 95 % of the 
business representatives assembled by MEDEF after its reform and implemented in the 
following years: MEDEF withdrew from UCANSS in 2000, threatened to leave 
UNEDIC and withdrew from ACOSS and the CGPME in 2001.  
Compared with other European countries, collective negotiations never played a 
very important role in France, even though they have attained some of the highest 
coverage rates in the OECD – up to 92 % in 1985 – due to the governments’ capacity to 
extend and enlarge sectoral agreements (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). Crucial 
issues often move from the bargaining level to the political arena. Therefore, it is 
difficult to evaluate the evolution of collective negotiations by looking at the pure 
number of agreements. In fact, the actual number of agreements has not changed: About 
thirty are signed every year (Ministère de l'emploi du travail et de la cohésion sociale 
2004: 18).18 At the sectoral level, the number of collective agreements is equally stable, 
but it is questionable whether the number of agreements reflects their importance. In 
contrast, the negotiations at the firm level have exploded over the last twenty years. 
Before the 1980s, few firms even conducted individual negotiations (Saurugger 
                                                 
17
 See for example, Institut de l’Entreprise (1995), Paritarisme: conditions et enjeux, Paris: 
Institut de l’Entreprise.  
18
 Not counting amendments.  
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forthcoming: 7). As a result of European integration, the declining importance of 
national negotiations and new legislation, the number of firm-level agreements 
increased radically: from 1,955 in 1983 to an average of about 10,000 per year in the 
late 1990s and again after 2003. 
At a more qualitative level, Lallement (forthcoming 2006) notes the 
transformation of collective bargaining away from encompassing regulation towards 
more contractual agreements, which provide important leverage for adjustment to the 
firms. A significant change in this context was the interprofessional agreement on 
contractual policy from October 1995, which reversed the hierarchy between sectoral 
and company-level agreements. While firms were previously allowed to make 
adjustments to sectoral agreements only if these were provided beforehand, sectoral 
agreements now applied to firms only where local negotiations had failed. In line with 
these developments, MEDEF made the continued decentralization of collective 
negotiations one of its principal objectives, which eventually led to an agreement 
between the social partners in 2001 and then to a proposed bill of a reformed social 
dialogue in 2003 (Lallement and Mériaux 2003). 
The transformation of French firms’ collective action in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century indicates that centralized activities are being called into question. 
Traditionally, the CNPF played an important role in state-led institutions. After all, we 
have seen that it was the French government which incited the creation of the CGPF, 
which was watched suspiciously by the sectoral federations. After the Second World 
War, the CNPF became the bridgehead between the interests of French firms and 
employers, and the state and trade unions. Through this representative function, the 
CNPF was able to give the impression of business unity. After the internationalization 
of markets, however, this bridgehead function of peak business associations disappeared 
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in most countries during the 1980s and the 1990s (Streeck and Visser 2006). Without 
the threat of state intervention or trade union strength, the different corporate interest 
groups in France have retreated to their own particular interests and focused on their 
competition with one another. The survey results, the radical drop in electoral 
participation and the desire to decentralize collective negotiations indicate that the few 
remaining neo-corporatist elements were rapidly losing legitimacy at the end of the 
twentieth century. In France, this cast doubt on the need for central coordination of 
diverse business interests through the CNPF/MEDEF. 
4. The reform of MEDEF: Display of strength or crisis management?  
An examination of the history of French business representation, the diversity of 
its institutional forms and interests and its evolution since the 1970s stresses the fact 
that the reform from the CNPF to MEDEF has to be understood as a response to a sense 
of crisis. Above all, the main stake in this reinvention was the management of its 
internal heterogeneity. The political context facilitated MEDEF’s tackling its internal 
reform. However, the fact that MEDEF succeeded in giving the impression that 
corporate France spoke with one voice is not the result of a change in the nature of 
collective action of French firms, but rather of the political effort inside the organization 
and a concerted effort to change its image. In order to respond to new challenges and 
apply what it had learned from its political weakness in the 1990s, MEDEF followed 
two objectives in its reform: the decentralization of collective action and the 
reinforcement of its communication strategy. With this strategy, Ernest Antoine-
Seillière took up one of the central ideas of an internal report on the future of the peak 
organization written in 1997: In order to re-establish its authority in the eyes of French 
firms, the organization was to renounce “all artificial forms of legitimacy,” such as 
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collective negotiations or the administration of bipartite institutions dictated by legal 
obligation, and to focus on developing “influence leadership” (Scherrer 1997). The peak 
organization no longer wanted to act continuously on behalf of its members, a goal 
which previously paralyzed the organization. Instead, it was trying to become the place 
where general guidelines were elaborated and agreed upon, and where these guidelines 
were then communicated to the government and the general public.  
4.1. The logic of membership: Decentralization and service provision 
The decentralization of collective action is an effort that started long before 
1998, but that continues to play an important role in the new orientation of MEDEF. 
After a period of “great contractual policies” under François Ceyrac, who was first head 
of the Social Commission and then president of the CNPF from 1972–1981, the peak 
organization tried to move away from encompassing negotiations on behalf of its 
members (Seillière 2005: 50). In the words of Schmitter and Streeck (1999), the peak 
organization shifted its emphasis away from the logic of influence towards the logic of 
membership: Instead of trying to influence governmental decisions and trade unions, it 
concentrated increasingly on the services it had to offer to its members. Bunel notes that 
“the member has turned into a client.” In his interviews, business representatives 
confirm that “entrepreneurs decide to join only because the organization can offer a 
return on their membership fees.” Put differently, “there are no militant entrepreneurs 
anymore. Business leaders join to get services” (Bunel 1995: 88).  
What are these services? According to several business representatives, one of 
the principal reasons to become a member of business associations is the insurance 
regimes that members can benefit from: the garantie sociale des dirigeants, an 
unemployment insurance for CEOs financed through membership fees, but also 
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ASTRE, an insurance that facilitates the transferal of firms or property and reduces the 
taxes to be paid on such transactions (Coulouarn 2004: 6).19 Furthermore, MEDEF 
provides a long list of consulting services and educational programs in areas such as 
administrative and fiscal management. It also serves as a clearinghouse for information 
that is useful to entrepreneurs. Its large regional and sectoral network helps firms invest 
or broaden their operations in different parts of the country. Created in 1989, MEDEF 
International extends this service abroad and provides support and advice to French 
firms doing business in foreign countries. A number of events, meetings, newsletters, 
online publications and recently also “MEDEF TV” help help to inform members about 
MEDEF’s services.20 
This service orientation imposed itself once the CNPF realized that it could no 
longer just be the interface of French business with the state and the trade union 
movement. In his speech to the General Assembly in 1987, François Périgot (quoted in 
Bunel 1995: 130), a former president of the CNPF, addressed those that 
… wonder about the future of the CNPF in an economy that is less and less 
administered by the state and more and more liberated … . Our political mission must be 
adapted to reflect the relocation of decision-making centers, and our organization needs 
to seek involvement at the new levels of authority where the destiny of our firms is 
increasingly being decided upon: Europe and the regions.  
Indeed, the CNPF became very active in European and international affairs with 
the creation of CNPF International and later with the help of its Brussels office and the 
leadership of François Périgot, who was to become president of the European peak 
association Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne (UNICE) from 1994 to 
1998. 
Reviving regional activities turned out to be more difficult, because it is not 
exactly clear how a comprehensive organization can decentralize its activities without 
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 Moreover, membership comes with a tax incentive, since membership fees can be deducted 
from taxable income.  
20
 Medef TV is not a television channel, but a collection of audio-files on the activities of the 
peak organization that can be downloaded from their website: <http://ww.medef.fr>.  
 26 
losing its function entirely. Still, the will to act less on fundamental questions on behalf 
of its members continued, and decentralization advanced incrementally. Back in 1969, 
the reform of the CNPF pursued the goal of giving greater authority to the peak 
organization, enabling it to speak for its members in collective negotiations, with the 
exception of salaries (Seillière 2005: 49). The failure of negotiations on flexible 
employment marked the end of the grande politique contractuelle promoted by the 
CNPF. In late 1978, the CNPF acknowledged the failure of this model and started 
promoting “the competitive administration of social progress” (Weber 1986: 296). After 
this date, the CNPF focused on procedural negotiations at the national level and 
delegated the bulk of negotiations to the sectoral or firm level. As a consequence, the 
reform of the CNPF in 1997 followed the opposite objective of the one in 1969. Having 
been defeated on the issue of the 35-hour work week, the peak organization emphasized 
that it was no longer interested in the traditional tripartism at the national level. 
Newspapers quoted business leaders as having replaced “the negotiator” Jean Gandois 
with “the killer” Ernest-Antoine Seillière as the president of the CNPF in the election on 
December 16, 1997. 
Under Seillière’s leadership, the CNPF modified its statutes and changed its 
name and logo at the General Assembly in Strasbourg on October 27, 1998. Declaring 
that “tripartism was no longer adequate,” Seillière promoted leadership based on 
subsidiarity and communication. General guidelines and grand projects were elaborated 
at the highest level, but the implementation was in the hands of the sectors and the 
individual firms, the levels where “the most efficient compromise between the 
imperatives of competition and the aspirations of the workforce can be found.”21 
Despite the apparent peak-level activism, MEDEF’s “social re-foundation program” 
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 E.-A. Seillière quoted in “La refondation sociale et l’avenir du Medef,” Le Monde, 8 October 
2003. 
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was mainly a vehicle for decentralizing collective negotiations towards the company 
level (Mériaux forthcoming).  
4.2. Societal projects and communication 
Still, the challenge for MEDEF was to go through this process without becoming 
obsolete. To this end, MEDEF put an enormous emphasis on developing large projects 
and promoting them with a new and ambitious communication strategy. First of all, the 
transition from the CNPF to MEDEF was primarily the “launch of a new brand”22 
aimed at changing the image of firms as political actors. The new word “movement” 
was chosen to inspire a new dynamism and “enterprise” as a reminder that the members 
are firms, which are necessary for the wealth of the country. The words “national” and 
“patronat” were dropped to get away from a sense of self-centeredness, protectionism 
and class struggle. As a final step in the internal reform, the organization was quite 
literally conscious of renovating its façade and moved into a new building in 2003.  
However, the transformation of the organization did not just revolve around its 
image; it was first and foremost a change in political strategy. Disappointed by its lack 
of clout in the state-led social dialogue, MEDEF decided to aim higher. Rather than just 
giving its opinion when it asked, it wanted to take charge of developing its own policy 
alternatives and socio-economic projects. Through the proposition of large action plans 
under the heading of “social re-foundation,” MEDEF was trying to become a think tank 
which incited debates on societal issues and even organized a yearly summer university 
and promotional tour on the value of enterprise in schools. The action plans covered a 
diverse set of domains: unemployment, pensions, health, collective negotiations and 
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 According to MEDEF itself: “1997–2002: Les entrepreneurs en mouvement,” La revue des 
entreprises, n° 647, December 2002, pp. 11–21.  
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vocational training, but also more general issues such as sustainable development 
(Lallement and Mériaux 2003). 
The elaboration and promotion of policy alternatives has become essential to the 
work of MEDEF. This explains why the communication strategy has changed 
dramatically. Ehrmann (1957: 184) has described the traditional “passion for 
anonymity” of French business leaders, who seemed to be “genetically predisposed to 
thinking that being happy means living in secret.” Indeed, for a long time French 
business leaders felt that it was necessary to be discreet to have political influence. 
Certainly this conviction had evolved over time, but it was completely abandoned under 
the new communication strategy. Unlike other responsibilities with the organization, 
communication was under the direct leadership of the president of MEDEF since the 
reform, which illustrates the importance of the domain. Monthly press conferences were 
organized and the president started appearing on an impressive number of radio and 
television shows in the years following his election. The new communication machine 
and the effort put into publicity had a tremendous impact. In the years following the 
reform, the presence of MEDEF in the print media was stronger than ever. 
Today, the political strategy of MEDEF is to try to affect political decision-
making through public opinion, which depends crucially on communication.23 The 
election of Laurence Parisot to the presidency of MEDEF in July 2005 is particularly 
noteworthy in this context. Unlike her predecessors, she did not have a background in 
the traditional industrial branches; she is the CEO of the Institut Français d’Opinion 
Publique, a major public opinion polling company. Even the background of its 
presidents thus indicates that the French business confederation has put a new emphasis 
on public communication. 
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 See also “Le Medef s’appuie sur une nouvelle force de frappe depuis 1998,” Le Monde, 15 
January 2002. 
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The elaboration and promotion of large projects is a domain it can fill 
legitimately without questioning its relations with the autonomous subunits of the 
political representation structure. After all, 77 % of entrepreneurs would have liked the 
organization to take on this role in 1994, while only 21 % encouraged its work as an 
employers’ association.24 The reorientation of MEDEF’s strategy is therefore well 
received by French entrepreneurs. In 1999, 39 % felt that MEDEF’s work reflected the 
reality of French firms, up from only 25 % in 1996.25 The communication strategy 
complements the selective disengagement from traditional institutions: The empty chair 
strategy in the tripartite institutions and the abandonment of discreet consultation all 
work to make MEDEF the deliberative centre of the French patronat. But it is no longer 
an organization acting on behalf of French firms in all political and socio-economic 
contexts.  
In summary, the reform of MEDEF needs to be understood in the context of a 
legitimacy crisis. Paralyzed internally by the heterogeneity of French business interests, 
the organization replaced its two social and economic commissions – forums where 
many of the tensions crystallized – through nine flexible “action and proposition 
groups.” A decision-making reform abandoned the consensus requirement and replaced 
it with a majority vote. With a continuing emphasis on service provision and 
decentralization, the organization is now able to act as a deliberative centre that enjoys 
legitimacy in the eyes of its members. 
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 BVA study published in “Quel patron pour les patrons?” L’Expansion, no. 486, 7 November 
1994. 
25
 CFA-BFM survey of SMEs in “Le Medef toujours trop loin des patrons,” Libération, 24 
September 1999. 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this article was to analyze the difficult collective action of a national 
business association in the last fifteen years. Through a detailed investigation of 
indications such as voting behaviour and industrial relations, it has shown that internal 
heterogeneity have become particularly stressful for the French peak organization in the 
light of internationalization and the opening up of new political opportunities for its 
constitutive groups and individual firms. The reinvention of CNPF into MEDEF and its 
new public relations strategy was a reaction to this crisis and an attempt to transform the 
organization in a business lobby focused on the elaboration of grand projects and public 
opinion.  
The French study highlights that we need to look at the details of an 
organizations’ membership relations, if we want the challenges of recent economic and 
political developments. In his study of membership density, Traxler (2006) shows that 
the density of the peak employer organization hardly changed in 20 countries from 1986 
– 1996. In fact, France’s CNPF even remained one of the densest organizations of the 
sample. The stability of employer representation is a remarkable finding, since union 
density for the same countries displays a comparatively higher decline over the same 
period. Our case study indicates that the aggregate figures do not tell the complete story. 
Stability in organization density notwithstanding, national peak associations for 
business and employers are under stress comparable to that put on national labour 
unions. However, the organizational dilemmas of firms do not manifest themselves in 
membership data as easily as they do for trade unions.  
Nation-wide collective action of French business interests is a fragile process: 
No matter how reinforced it can be in times of adversity, it always threatens to fall apart 
in the long run. In the 1990s, the collective action of French firms was undergoing a 
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crisis, because the neo-corporatist elements and the old contractual policy had become 
obsolete. As a consequence, the central peak organization was no longer needed as a 
bridgehead between the state, labour representatives and employers. For the time being, 
the crisis management seems to be working. MEDEF appears as the voice of French 
firms, and its activities as a demonstration of force. Yet the tensions inside the 
organization will continue and one can wonder about the life-span of this new 
appearance. If MEDEF succeed in decentralizing the collective action of French firms 
and starts to work only as a lobby for its members, it effectively dissolves the principal 
justifications for a nation-wide confederation of French firms.  
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Figure 1: The universe of political representation of French firms 
 
 
EDC 
CJD 
FCE Sectoral 
federation 
Sectoral 
federation 
 
Craft 
association 
Craft 
association 
 
Craft 
association 
 
Craft 
association 
 
Local 
association 
Local 
association 
Local 
association 
Local 
association 
 
Regional 
association 
Regional 
association 
 
CGPME Medef UPA UNAPL 
Firm Firm 
 
Firm 
 
Firm 
 
AFEP 
ETHIC 
etc. 
 33 
Figure 2: Electoral participation of entrepreneurs (%)  
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